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Trivializing Torture: The Office of Legal Counsel’s
2002 Opinion Letter and International Law Against Torture
by Rober t K. Goldman
war since the mid–19th century and are codified in the four 1949
Geneva Conventions and their two Additional Protocols of 1977.
So extensive and well-established is the prohibition against
torture in general international law that it imposes on states obligations erga omnes—that is, obligations that every state owes to all
other members of the international community. Moreover, the
proscription against torture is also widely regarded as having
attained the status of jus cogens, or a peremptory norm embodying
a fundamental standard that no state can contravene. Although
cruel, degrading, or inhuman treatment is also clearly prohibited
by customary law, its status as jus cogens remains unclear.
This universal condemnation of torture precludes any state
not only from engaging in torture, but also from expelling, returning, “rendering,” or extraditing a person to another state where
there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would
be in danger of being tortured.

I

APRIL OF THIS YEAR, GRAPHIC PICTURES surfaced in
the U.S. and foreign media depicting the ill-treatment of
Iraqi detainees by U.S. military personnel at the Abu Ghraib
prison near Baghdad. Shortly thereafter, excerpts of a leaked
report prepared by Major General Antonio Taguba, who investigated these abuses in February 2004, appeared in the May 10 issue
of the New Yorker magazine. In his report, Taguba confirmed that
U.S. military police had punched, slapped, and kicked Iraqi
detainees, forced them to strip and perform sex acts, and had used
military dogs to intimidate them. Labeling such conduct “sadistic,
blatant and wanton criminal abuse,” Gen. Taguba concluded that
the U.S. personnel involved had committed “grave breaches of
international law.”
The furor at home and abroad over the prison scandal was
soon fueled by the publication of several leaked memoranda prepared by lawyers and other Executive branch officials concerning
the interrogation of persons detained by the United States in the
“war on terrorism,” including those held at Guantanamo Bay and
elsewhere. Of these memos, the August 1, 2002, legal opinion prepared by the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel for
Alberto Gonzales, counsel to President Bush, is the most revealing
and dismaying in its argumentation. Written in response to a
request from the CIA seeking authority to conduct more “vigorous” interrogations of terrorist suspects, the opinion has been
harshly criticized for essentially authorizing and justifying torture
in violation of international and U.S. law. Before examining that
opinion, it might prove instructive to review the nature of the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment in international law, and to briefly survey the jurisprudence
of key human rights bodies on the subject.
N LATE
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THE PROHIBITION OF TORTURE
BOTH TORTURE AND CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING treatment are absolutely prohibited by conventional and customary
international human rights and humanitarian law. These proscriptions in human rights law are contained in the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the 1948 American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 1984 UN Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment (Torture Convention), the American Convention on
Human Rights (American Convention), the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention), and the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Each of these treaties
(except for the African Charter) expressly made prohibitions of
torture non-derogable, which means that they cannot be suspended for any reason, including war or any other emergency situation.
Comparable prohibitions have evolved in the customary laws of
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THE DEFINITION OF TORTURE
ALTHOUGH VIRTUALLY EVERY MODERN international humanitarian law convention and human rights treaty dealing with civil and
political rights proscribes torture, none of these instruments
defines the term “torture” or indicates how it is to be differentiated from cruel, degrading, or inhuman treatment. The principal
international instrument that contains such a definition is the
Torture Convention. This treaty, to which the United States is a
party, defines torture as

Human Rights has generally looked to the definition of torture
contained in the 1985 Inter-American Torture Convention, which
is somewhat broader than the definition in the Torture
Convention. The Inter-American Commission has indicated that
torture must combine the following three elements: “1. it must be
an intentional act through which physical and mental pain and
suffering is inflicted on a person; 2. it must be committed with a
purpose (such as personal punishment or intimidation) or intentionally (i.e. to produce a certain result in the victim); and 3. it
must be committed by a public official or by a private person acting at the instigation of the former.”
Both the Inter-American Commission and Court have consulted decisions of the European Court and Commission to assess
whether an act or treatment attains a minimum level of severity in
order to be considered “inhuman or degrading.” The Inter-American
Commission has said that “[t]he evaluation of this ‘minimum’ level is
relative and depends on the circumstances in each case, such as the
duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects, and, in
some cases, the sex, age, and health of the victim.” In the Loayza
Tamayo case, the Inter-American Court, citing the European Court’s
judgment in Ribitsch v. Austria, noted that degrading treatment is
characterized by fear, anxiety, and inferiority induced for the purpose

… any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity.
This definition, arguably, reflects a consensus that is representative of customary international law.
The treaty categorically declares that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be
invoked as a justification of torture.” In addition, it stipulates that
“an order from a superior officer or public authority may not be
invoked as a justification of torture.” The treaty also prohibits, but
does not define the terms cruel, degrading, and inhuman treatment or punishment.

"The Office of Legal
Counsel’s arguments reflect
either an appalling ignorance
of, or sheer contempt for,
international law."

INTERNATIONAL LAW ON TORTURE
AND OTHER ILL-TREATMENT
OVER THE YEARS, THE SUPERVISORY BODIES established by universal
and regional human rights treaties have developed an extensive and
rich body of jurisprudence on the subject of torture and ill-treatment. Many of their decisions, especially early ones, do not, however, make clear a distinction between torture and cruel, degrading, and inhuman treatment.
In a leading case, Ireland v. the U.K., the European Court of
Human Rights indicated that one basic distinction between torture and cruel, degrading, or inhuman treatment “primarily results
from the intensity of the suffering inflicted.” Torture involves
deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering. In the Greek case, the European Commission indicated that
torture is generally an aggravated form of inhuman treatment perpetrated with a purpose, namely, obtaining information or a confession. In that case, the European Commission found that the
practice of inflicting severe beatings to all parts of the body constituted torture and ill-treatment. More recently, the European Court
in Aksoy v. Turkey found that suspending the victim, who was
stripped naked, by the arms, which were tied behind his neck, for
the purpose of obtaining information or admissions from him
amounted to torture. In Aydin v. Turkey, the Court concluded that
the rape of the victim during her detention, together with her having been blindfolded, paraded naked, and kept in a continuous
state of physical pain and mental anguish, constituted torture.
When determining what constitutes torture under the
American Convention, the Inter-American Commission on

of humiliating and degrading the victim and breaking his physical
and moral resistance. The Court also noted that the degrading aspect
of treatment can be exacerbated by the vulnerability of a person who
is detained unlawfully. Finally, the Court noted that the exigencies
and difficulties associated with anti-terrorist struggles cannot justify
restricting a person’s right to physical security.
Despite adopting the European Court’s formulation of the
difference between torture and other ill-treatment, the InterAmerican Commission and Court have found it difficult and usually unnecessary to distinguish clearly between the two. More
specifically, they have found the following acts or measures to constitute torture or inhumane treatment in the context of interrogation and detention: prolonged incommunicado detention; keeping
detainees hooded and naked in cells; interrogating them under the
drug pentothal; imposing a restricted diet leading to malnutrition;
applying electric shocks to a person; holding a person’s head in
water until the point of drowning; standing or walking on top of
individuals; cutting with pieces of broken glass; putting a hood
over a person’s head and burning him or her with lighted cigarettes;
rape; mock burials, mock executions, beatings, deprivation of food
and water; threats of a behavior that would constitute inhumane
2
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TRIVIALIZING TORTURE
SUBSEQUENT TO ITS INVASION OF IRAQ, the United States for-

treatment; threats of removal of body parts; exposure to the torture
of other victims; and death threats.
The UN Human Rights Committee has found similar acts or
conduct to constitute torture and other inhumane treatment. These
include beatings, electric shocks, and mock executions, forcing prisoners to remain standing for extremely long periods of time, and
holding persons incommunicado for more than three months while
keeping that person blindfolded with hands tied together, resulting
in limb paralysis, leg injuries, substantial weight loss, and eye infection. In addition, the UN Committee against Torture, established
under the Torture Convention, has indicated that the threat of torture, severe sleep deprivation, and forcing a person to sleep on a
floor handcuffed after interrogation constitute torture and that
physically restraining, in very painful conditions, and hooding a
person can amount to cruel, degrading, or inhuman treatment.
The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has listed several acts
that involve the infliction of suffering severe enough to constitute
torture. These include, for example, beating; extraction of nails,
teeth, etc.; burns; electric shocks; suspension; suffocation; exposure
to excessive light or noise; sexual aggression; administration of
drugs in detention or psychiatric institutions; prolonged denial of
rest or sleep, food, sufficient hygiene, or medical assistance; total
isolation and sensory deprivation; being held in constant uncertainty in terms of space and time; threats to torture or kill relatives;
and simulated executions. For its part, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has found rape to constitute torture and noted that keeping someone in solitary confinement may
amount to torture “to the extent that the confinement … can be
shown to pursue one of the prohibited purposes of torture and to
have caused the victim severe pain and suffering.”
As previously noted, torture and inhumane treatment are
absolutely prohibited in all armed conflicts by customary and conventional rules of international humanitarian law. In situations of
international armed conflict, including occupation, the Third and
Fourth Geneva Conventions mandate that prisoners of war and
civilian detainees, respectively, must at all times be treated
humanely. The Third Convention provides that “no physical or
mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted
on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind
whatsoever.” The Fourth Convention similarly enjoins the use of
any “physical or moral coercion” against protected civilians “in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties.”
Both treaties make the willful killing, torture, or inhuman treatment of, or causing great suffering or serious injury to, protected
persons “grave breaches,” meaning very serious war crimes.
Furthermore, persons held as unprivileged combatants in
international hostilities, but who are denied protection under the
Third or Fourth Geneva Conventions (which includes the
Guantanamo Bay detainees), are not without rights and protection
under international law. They are entitled, as a matter of customary law, to the minimum guarantees enumerated in the Geneva
Conventions’ Common Article 3 and Article 75 of Additional
Protocol I. These provisions prohibit at any time and in any place
the infliction of torture or cruel, humiliating, and degrading treatment. Common Article 3’s fundamental guarantees also apply in
all non-international armed conflicts to all persons who do not, or
who no longer, actively participate in the hostilities when they are
in the hands of a party to the conflict.

mally recognized that it had become an occupying power under
the Geneva Conventions and the 1907 Hague Regulations. As
such, international humanitarian law was applicable throughout
occupied Iraq and was binding on the nationals, both civilian and
military, of the occupying powers. In the case of the United States,
the law applied not only to members of the U.S. armed forces, but
to CIA employees and private contractors as well. Under this law
and customary human rights law, the United States was obliged to
refrain from mistreating, much less torturing, any persons detained
or interrogated by its armed forces and other agents. Indeed, the
U.S. Army’s Field Manual 34-52, echoing these international proscriptions, categorically provides that the “use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane
treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is neither authorized or condoned by the U.S. Government.” Despite this policy, it
is now well established that U.S. military police and interrogators
subjected the Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib, who were de jure protected persons under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions
to acts constituting torture and other ill-treatment under any fair
reading of the Torture Convention.
But this conduct—that Genaral Taguba termed “wanton
criminal abuse”—would not amount to torture under the Office of
Legal Counsel’s legal opinion. By narrowly interpreting, or more
precisely, distorting the definition of torture contained in the 1994
federal law implementing the Torture Convention, the opinion
states that “physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent
in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such
as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.”
For mental pain and suffering to amount to torture, the opinion
adds, “it must result in significant psychological harm of significant duration, lasting for months or even years.” The opinion also
argues that a defendant is guilty of torture under the statute “only
if he acts with the express purpose of inflicting severe pain or suffering.” Accordingly, if the defendant’s purpose is to obtain information, even though he knows that “severe pain will result from
his actions,” he lacks the requisite “specific intent” to violate the
statute. Reflecting its concern about this particular interpretation,
the American Bar Association recently urged that the statute
implementing the Torture Convention be amended “to encompass
torture wherever committed, and regardless of the underlying
motive or purpose.”
The opinion also contends that interrogators could justify
breaching U.S. law and treaties prohibiting torture by invoking the
doctrines of necessity and self-defense in the prosecution of the
“war on terrorism.” It reasons that if a U.S. interrogator tortured
an enemy combatant during an interrogation, “he would be doing
so in order to prevent future attacks on the United States by the Al
Qaeda terrorist network.” The interrogator’s actions could also be
“justified by the executive branch’s constitutional authority to protect the nation from attack.” In short, the opinion concludes that
the president, as commander-in-chief, is above international and
domestic law and so, too, are those who act under his authority.
Apart from ignoring Supreme Court decisions rejecting such
exorbitant claims of executive powers, the Office of Legal
Counsel’s arguments reflect either an appalling ignorance of, or
sheer contempt for, international law. The Torture Convention,
3

the Geneva Conventions, and the ICCPR, all treaties ratified by
the United States, absolutely prohibit torture in all circumstances,
including wars, whatever their motive or kind. The contention
that the “war on terrorism” can justify violating absolute prohibitions in international law resurrects a defense that was resoundingly rejected by various tribunals in war crimes prosecutions after
World War II. In the German High Command Trial, In re Von Leeb
and Others, the U.S. Military Tribunal observed that were military
necessity to confer on a belligerent the right to do anything that
contributed to winning the war, “it would eliminate all humanity
and decency and all law from the conduct of war and it is a contention which the Tribunal repudiates as contrary to the accepted
usages of civilized nations.”
It would be difficult to construct legal arguments that could
be more exquisitely antithetical to and utterly destructive of the
underlying object and purpose of the Torture Convention than
those contained in the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion. By virtually sanctioning conduct equivalent to torture under the treaty
and effectively laying out a roadmap of how to shield torturers
from criminal prosecution, the legal opinion virtually renders
meaningless the United States’ adherence to that instrument.
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THE AFTERMATH
IN JUNE 2004, FACED WITH A FIRESTORM OF CRITICISM over the
content of this opinion and other leaked memos, Bush
Administration officials indicated that it was reviewing the Office
of Legal Counsel’s opinion and that decision makers had not relied
on it. A leaked confidential March 2003 report prepared by a
Pentagon working group on detainee interrogation for Secretary
Rumsfeld, however, belies that assertion, as that report repeats
many of the same arguments made by the Office of Legal
Counsel’s 2002 opinion letter. Moreover, it has been reported that
after he received the working group’s report, Secretary Rumsfeld
approved a series of interrogation techniques, some of which were
first used on the Guantanamo detainees and later on Iraqis held at
the Abu Ghraib prison.
One of the few pieces of encouraging news in this still unfolding scandal is that, according to press reports, senior military
lawyers in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, as well lawyers
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, either objected to, or expressed concerns over the aggressive interrogation techniques favored by political appointees at the Justice and Defense Departments. These military lawyers reportedly argued rather presciently that not only
would such techniques violate longstanding military policy and
practice, but “were subject to abuse that could haunt U.S. policymakers and endanger U.S. military personnel detained by other
countries” and “provoke a storm of public criticism if the tactics
became known.”
The lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel who prepared the
August 2002 opinion letter not only poorly served the president
and damaged the nation’s credibility overseas, but also undercut
over fifty years of efforts to establish effective international safeguards on the treatment of wartime detainees, compromised the
moral and legal basis for this country to denounce torture practiced elsewhere, and placed U.S. citizens who are captured abroad
at greater risk. The administration should unequivocally disavow
the content of this opinion and reaffirm our nation’s commitment
to treat all detainees humanely in accordance with U.S. and interHRB
national law.
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